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1543 
HOW ON EARTH CAN YOU POSSIBLY 
“FILE” AN ORAL COMPLAINT?:   
AN ANALYSIS OF THE BOUNDARIES OF 
§ 215(A)(3) OF THE FAIR LABOR 
STANDARDS ACT 
SCOTT C. ROSS† 
INTRODUCTION 
The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA” or the “Act”) requires 
most employers to pay minimum wages and overtime to 
employees working more than forty hours per week.1  To protect 
employees from retaliation by their employer if they “file any 
complaint” with regard to FLSA-related issues, Congress enacted 
§ 215(a)(3).2  Despite the seemingly plain and clear meaning of 
the phrase “filed any complaint,” courts are split over how to 
interpret this language.  Specifically, the courts of appeals are 
divided on the question of whether § 215(a)(3) protects employees 
who make informal oral complaints⎯for example, oral 
complaints made at work to a supervisor.3  The strict view is that 
the plain language of this provision limits the causes of action.4  
 
† Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. 
John’s University School of Law; B.S., 2005, Pennsylvania State University.  
1 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 206, 207, 212 (West 2011). 
2 Section 215(a)(3) provides that “it shall be unlawful for any person to 
discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such 
employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any 
proceeding . . . or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding.” Id. 
§ 215(a)(3).  
3 THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: 2009 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT 950–51 
(Amy P. Maloney et al. eds., Supp. 2009). Throughout this Note, a “formal” 
complaint, written or verbal, implies that the complaint was externally made to a 
regulatory agency, such as the Department of Labor. An “informal” complaint, 
written or verbal, refers to a complaint internally made in the workplace.   
4 See Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Kasten v. 
Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 840 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting 
that an expansive interpretation of § 215(a)(3) may be warranted because of the 
remedial nature of the FLSA, but “reading words out of a statute” is something else), 
cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (No. 09-834). 
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The broad interpretation protects oral complaints because 
§ 215(a)(3) was meant to address employee fears of retaliation for 
raising complaints.5   
As the split between the circuits grows and the number of 
retaliatory complaints increases,6 resolution of the inter-circuit 
dispute becomes increasingly important.7  While the goal of the 
FLSA is to protect employees, an interpretation of § 215(a)(3) 
that protects any oral complaint made in the workplace—
informal oral complaints—would put employers at a 
disadvantage.  First, the FLSA is already deferential to 
employees.  But if an expansive approach is adopted, the 
employer will have to disprove that the employee verbally 
complained, a much more difficult task than if the employee had 
to follow a more formal procedure, particularly during discovery.8  
Second, protecting oral complaints opens the courts up to 
frivolous lawsuits where an employee “manufacture[s] a 
retaliation claim” after being fired.9  Third, as a result of 
frivolous lawsuits, employers will be subject to significant  
 
 
5 See Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). These 
circuits emphasize that employer compliance with the provisions of the FLSA is 
without federal oversight and is maintained by a system in which employees should 
be free to voice grievances without the fear of economic retaliation. See Mitchell v. 
Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).   
6 Since 1997, the number of retaliatory charges brought to the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has steadily increased, from 
18,198, which was 22.6% of all complaints in 1997, to 22,768, which was 27.0% of all 
EEOC complaints in 2002, to 33,613, which was 36.0% of all EEOC complaints in 
2009. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGE STATISTICS FY 
1997 THROUGH FY 2010, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement 
/charges.cfm (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). While these statistics cover the retaliatory 
charges of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Equal Pay Act, 
“[s]uch a dramatic increase in retaliation charges arguably is not confined [just to 
those statutes], but extends to the FLSA as well.” Jennifer Lynne Redmond, Are You 
Breaking Some Sort of Law?: Protecting an Employee’s Informal Complaints Under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
319, 319 n.1 (2000).   
7 “As the number of retaliation charges continues to increase, it becomes more 
important to understand the statutory provisions governing retaliation so that they 
may be applied consistently.” Redmond, supra note 6, at 319–20.   
8 See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 31–34 and 
accompanying text (discussing the burden-shifting scheme). 
9 See Kelly v. City of Mount Vernon, 344 F. Supp. 2d 395, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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penalties if the employee is successful.10  An employer may even 
be forced to settle with an undeserving employee so as to avoid 
litigation costs and potential liability.   
This Note argues that it is necessary to find a balance 
between the liberal and strict approaches when interpreting the 
anti-retaliatory provision of the FLSA.  Part I of this Note 
provides background on the FLSA, its retaliatory provision, and a 
proposed amendment to the retaliatory provision currently before 
the Senate and House of Representatives.  Part II addresses the 
various arguments the courts of appeals consider to arrive at 
their conclusion on how to interpret § 215(a)(3), including abiding 
by the plain language, examining the purpose of the Act, and 
comparing it to similar anti-retaliation provisions.  Though the 
language is unambiguous, Part III argues that the policy and 
purpose of § 215(a)(3) requires courts to look past its clear 
language.  However, this Note concludes that it would be 
improper for courts to protect informally made oral complaints 
from retaliation.  As a matter of best practice, an employee 
should be required to put his complaint in writing in order to be 
covered by § 215(a)(3).11 
I. THE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE FLSA AND ITS 
RETALIATORY PROVISION 
The history and background of the FLSA is important to 
understand before examining its retaliation scheme.  This 
background understanding describes what Congress did, and did 
not, intend when creating § 215(a)(3).  In addition, while the 
anti-retaliation provision has not changed for seventy-two years, 
there are proposed amendments to § 215(a)(3) currently pending 
before the Senate and House of Representatives.12   
 
 
 
10 Employers who violate § 215(a)(3) may have to reinstate or promote the 
injured employee. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West 2011).  
11 See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 839 
(7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (No. 09-834). 
12 See Fair Pay Act, S. 904, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009); Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 
11, 111th Cong. § 203 (2009). 
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A. The FLSA Was Enacted as a Means of Protecting Employees 
The FLSA was passed by Congress and signed by President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt on June 25, 1938 in the heart of the Great 
Depression.13  President Roosevelt declared that it was perhaps 
“the most far-reaching, . . . far-sighted program for the benefit of 
workers ever adopted.”14  The central aim of the act was to 
achieve certain minimum labor standards.15  The Supreme Court 
has stated that the “remedial and humanitarian” provisions of 
the FLSA as a whole are not to be applied in a “narrow, grudging 
manner.”16  Despite numerous amendments to the Act and 
periodic technical corrections because of changing judicial 
interpretations, the basic framework of the Act has remained 
intact.  While there have been periodic technical corrections to 
the Act because of changing judicial interpretations, as well as 
numerous amendments to it, its basic framework has not 
changed.17  
The FLSA has established itself as a law that serves 
fundamental national interests by providing a greater quality of 
life for employees.18  Individual employees19 are covered under 
the FLSA but not white collar employees.20  Employers are 
 
13 See THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 2, 15 (Ellen C. Kearns et al. eds., 1999).  
14 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address of the President Delivered by Radio 
from the White House (June 24, 1938), available at http://www.mhrcc.org/fdr/ 
chat13.html.   
15 See Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960). 
16 See Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 
(1944). The courts that argue for a broad enough interpretation of § 215(a)(3) so as to 
protect verbal complaints from employer retaliation often use this Supreme Court 
quote as a basis for their position. See, e.g., Lambert v. Ackerly, 180 F.3d 997, 1003 
(9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 
17 See generally THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, supra note 13, at 15–36. The 
most notable amendment was the 1963 addition of the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”). See 
id. at 27. 
18 Id. at 3. 
19 This is the traditional manner in which employees are covered only if they are 
“engaged in commerce” or in “production of goods for commerce.” Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 206(a), 207(a) (West 2011). For example, an 
autoworker at a car parts manufacturer would be covered by § 215(a)(3). See, e.g., 1 
MARK ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 627–28 (4th ed. 2009). 
20 See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2006). This includes the general class of executive, 
administrative, and professional employees. See id. There are several other exempt 
groups of individuals. See generally id. § 213(a)(3), (5)–(8), (10), (12), (15)–(17). 
However, white collar employees are not exempt under the EPA. See REBECCA 
HANNER WHITE, EMPLOYMENT LAW AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: ESSENTIAL 
TERMS AND CONCEPTS 168 (1998). 
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required to pay these employees minimum wages21 and 
overtime22 and to avoid the use of oppressive child labor.23  In 
1963, the FLSA was amended when the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) 
was added to prohibit employers from providing disparate 
salaries to employees based on their sex when the work is 
equal.24   
The U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) is empowered by 
Congress to enforce the various provisions of the FLSA.25  
However, there is no requirement to exhaust administrative 
remedies before bringing a FLSA claim before a court.26 
B. The FLSA Prohibits Retaliation Against Employees Who 
“File any Complaint” 
It is not unusual for an anti-discrimination statute to contain 
an anti-retaliation provision, as these provisions ensure that 
employees are protected when they assert their rights under that 
statute.27  Section 215(a)(3) of the FLSA provides that it shall be 
unlawful for “any person” to engage in retaliatory conduct.28  This 
person may not “discharge or in any other manner discriminate29 
against any employee because such employee has filed any 
complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any  
 
 
 
21 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 206. 
22 See id. § 207. 
23 See 29 U.S.C. § 212. 
24 See generally 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 206–09; see also THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS 
ACT, supra note 13, at 27.   
25 See THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, supra note 13, at 40. However, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is charged with enforcement of the 
EPA. See WHITE, supra note 20, at 167. There is no requirement under any portion 
of the FLSA to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing an FLSA claim 
before a court.  
26 See WHITE, supra note 20, at 167–68. 
27 See THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, supra note 13, at 867. 
28 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). The definition of “any person” who, under this Act, may 
not engage in retaliatory conduct includes “an individual, partnership, association, 
corporation, business trust, legal representative, or any organized group of persons.” 
Id. § 203(a). 
29 “The most common retaliatory act is discharge.” THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS 
ACT, supra note 13, at 896. Discriminatory acts include on-the-job harassment, wage 
reductions, and post-discharge blacklisting or disparagement. See Cartwright v. 
Tacala, Inc., No. CIV A 99-W-663-N, 2000 WL 33287445, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 1, 
2000); Contreras v. Corinthian Vigor Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 
1185 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
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proceeding . . . or has testified or is about to testify in any such 
proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry 
committee.”30 
To prove a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must 
show that: (1) he engaged in statutorily protected conduct under 
§ 215(a)(3); (2) he suffered some adverse employment action; and 
(3) there is a “causal link . . . between the plaintiff’s conduct and 
the employment action.”31  Once the plaintiff has made a prima 
facie showing of retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer to 
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive.32  To defeat 
the employer’s showing of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for discharge, the employee must show that the employer’s 
reason was a pretext for retaliation.33  If an employee can prove 
that the employer was partially motivated by the employee’s 
protected conduct, the employee will prevail.34 
An employer’s violation of § 215(a)(3) may entitle the 
employee to damages and equitable relief.35  Such relief includes, 
but is not limited to, employment, reinstatement, promotion, and 
the payment of wages lost.36  Reinstatement is generally the 
preferred remedy, unless there are compelling reasons why the 
employment relationship cannot continue.37 
 
30 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). 
31 THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, supra note 13, at 910. The plaintiff can 
establish causation by showing that the protected activity preceded the adverse 
action and that the employer was aware of the plaintiff’s protected activity before 
taking the adverse action. See id. at 912. 
32 See THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: 2009 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT, supra 
note 3, at 987. Legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for discharge have included 
excessive lateness in violation of company policy, see Cross v. Bally’s Health & 
Tennis Corp., 945 F. Supp. 883, 889 (D. Md. 1996), unacceptable job performance, 
see Chyma v. Trackers, Inc., No. 2-293/91-1266, 1992 WL 464328 (Iowa Ct. App. 
Nov. 30, 1992), and violating a company policy that prohibits accepting gifts from 
vendors and lying to company officials charged with investigating the inciden, see 
Conner v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1393 (10th Cir. 1997).  
33 See THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT: 2009 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT, supra 
note 3, at 987.   
34 See THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, supra note 13, at 915. 
35 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West 2011). 
36 Id. In fact, several circuits award compensatory, punitive, and emotional 
distress damages. See Lai v. Eastpoint Int’l, Inc., No. 99 CIV 2095, 2002 WL 265148, 
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (observing that the Seventh and Ninth Circuits “have 
interpreted the relief to include compensatory, punitive, and emotional distress 
damages,” but the Second is silent on the issue). 
37 See Goldberg v. Bama Mfg. Corp., 302 F.2d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1962).  
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Federal oversight to ensure cooperation with the FLSA has 
taken a back seat to a self-regulatory system, whereby the 
government relies on receiving complaints from employees rather 
than supervising employers itself.38  The idea is that effective 
enforcement can only be expected if employees feel free to 
approach officials with their grievances.39  If retaliation were 
permitted to go unremedied, it would have a “chilling effect upon 
the willingness of individuals to speak out against employment 
discrimination.”40  This would cause employees to fear being 
retaliated against, resulting in aggrieved employees quietly 
accepting substandard conditions.41 
C. Proposed Legislation To Amend the Anti-Retaliation 
Provision of the FLSA 
For seventy-two years, the wording of § 215(a)(3) has 
remained unchanged.42  However, a proposed amendment to 
§ 215(a) has recently been approved by the House of 
Representatives,43 and a different version of the proposed 
amendment is currently sitting unresolved before the Senate 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.44  The 
version approved by the House of Representatives strikes the 
language of § 215(a)(3) and replaces it with language that 
protects employees from retaliation if they made a “charge or 
filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any 
investigation . . . or ha[d] testified or is planning to testify . . . or 
ha[d] inquired about, discussed or disclosed the wages of the 
employee or another employee.”45  Thus, an employee would be 
entitled to protection from retaliation whenever he discusses 
wages, formally or informally, with his employer. 
 
38 See Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960) (“For 
weighty practical and other reasons, Congress did not seek to secure compliance 
with prescribed standards through continuing detailed federal supervision or 
inspection of payrolls. Rather it chose to rely on information and complaints received 
from employees seeking to vindicate rights claimed to have been denied.”). 
39 See id.  
40 See EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 8-I (1998), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
policy/docs/retal.html.   
41 See Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292.  
42 See generally THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, supra note 13, at 15–36. 
43 See Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 11, 111th Cong. § 203(b) (2009).  
44 See Fair Pay Act of 2009, S. 904, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009). 
45 H.R. 11, § 203(b). 
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The proposed legislation sitting before the Senate 
Subcommittee also carves out an exception to § 215(a)(3) but is 
very different than the version approved by the House of 
Representatives.  This version first adds a new category of 
protected activity, § 6(h), which is an extension of the Equal Pay 
Act, whereby an employer may not discriminate against 
employees “on the basis of sex, race, or national origin by paying 
[lower] wages.”46  Further, without striking § 215(a)(3), the 
proposed legislation states that an employer may not 
“discriminate against any individual because such individual has 
opposed any act or practice made unlawful by [§] 6(h).”47  It goes 
on to state that an employer may not retaliate against any 
“employee [who has] inquired about . . . [his] wages or the wages 
of any other employee, or because the employee exercised . . . any 
right granted or protected by [§] 6(h).”48  Therefore, under the 
proposed legislation, any complaint about wages or wage 
discrimination would fall under this much broader language, but 
the “filed any complaint” language would still apply to grievances 
about other statutorily enumerated issues, such as child labor or 
overtime hours. 
II. THERE IS NO INTER-CIRCUIT UNIFORMITY IN THE 
INTERPRETATION OF § 215(A)(3) 
Federal courts are divided as to whether § 215(a)(3) should 
protect employees who make informal verbal complaints to their 
employer from retaliation.  A broad reading of the statute accepts 
all sorts of oral complaints as being “filed,” whereas a strict 
reading tends to limit complaints “filed” to informally made 
written grievances or formally lodged ones.   
As a result of this circuit split, similarly situated employees 
are being treated differently depending on their jurisdiction.  An 
employee in a circuit that broadly construes § 215(a)(3) is 
completely protected from retaliation if he makes an oral 
complaint to his supervisor.  However, in a circuit that strictly 
 
46 S. 904, § 3. However, unlike the Equal Pay Act, this only applies to jobs that 
are “dominated by employees of a particular sex, race, or national origin” where 
employees are paid “at a rate less than the rate at which the employer pays wages to 
employees in such establishment in another job that is dominated by employees of 
the opposite sex or of a different race or national origin, respectively, for work on 
equivalent jobs.” Id. 
47 Id. § 4. 
48 Id. 
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construes § 215(a)(3), this same employee would not be protected 
and could very well be unemployed as a result.  Without clarity, 
this varying treatment frustrates the overall purpose of the 
FLSA, which is to ensure that all employees obtain a decent 
standard of living.49  
The courts of appeals rely on several different arguments to 
determine the degree of protection afforded to employees under 
§ 215(a)(3).  In general, the courts balance the language of 
§ 215(a)(3) against the policy governing its enforcement.50  They 
sometimes supplement these arguments with comparisons to 
similar retaliation provisions to justify their interpretation.51   
A. Arguments on Whether “Filed any Complaint” Is Ambiguous 
Because the legislative history of § 215(a)(3) does not clearly 
express a legislative intent as to the statute’s scope,52 courts that 
are charged with interpreting § 215(a)(3) begin by simply 
examining what the plain meaning of the text suggests.53   
Some courts find that despite the “remedial lens” that the 
FLSA should be read through,54 the unambiguous language of 
§ 215(a)(3) does not allow for the protection of oral complaints.55  
For example, in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics 
Corp., the Seventh Circuit found that an employee who was 
terminated after verbally complaining to his supervisor about 
billable time at work was not protected under § 215(a)(3).56  The 
court concluded that while § 215(a)(3) should be given an 
expansive reading, it still requires an employee to “submit some 
sort of writing” because it is impossible to “ ‘file’ an oral 
complaint.”57  Similarly, in Bartis v. John Bommarito 
 
49 See Daniel v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 57, 59 (N.D. Ga. 1986).  
50 See, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 
839–40 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (No. 09-834). 
51 See, e.g., id. at 840. 
52 See Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 42 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting 
that the legislative history of the FLSA provides no guidance as to the intended 
scope of § 215(a)(3)). 
53 See Kasten, 570 F.3d at 837–38 (“[A]bsent a clearly expressed legislative 
intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” 
(quoting Sapperstein v. Hager, 188 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 1999))).  
54 See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text. 
55 See Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000).  
56 See Kasten, 570 F.3d at 836.  
57 Id. at 838, 840. The court did, however, leave open the possibility that 
informal written documents could be protected. See id. 
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Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc.,58 a district court within the Eighth 
Circuit found that an employee who was fired after he verbally 
complained to his boss about a new timesheet policy was not 
entitled to § 215(a)(3) protection.59  While the court stated that 
there was some room for a broad interpretation, it concluded that 
“the statute cannot be construed so broadly as to depart from its 
plain and clear language” by protecting oral complaints.60  As 
such, these courts generally require a more “verifiable activity” 
than an oral complaint.61 
Some courts will not even look past the language of the 
statute because Congress’s obvious intent is evident in its plain 
language.62  For example, in Lambert v. Genesee Hospital,63 the 
Second Circuit held that a female employee who verbally 
complained to her supervisor about a wage disparity between 
herself and a similarly situated male employee was not entitled 
to § 215(a)(3) protection.64  The court limited the causes of action 
in a § 215(a)(3) case to three enumerated types of conduct: filing 
a formal complaint with the Department of Labor, instituting a 
proceeding, or testifying.65  Since the intent of Congress was clear 
according to this court, there was no need to look beyond the 
language of the statute.66  As a result, district courts within the 
Second Circuit have eliminated all informal workplace 
complaints from the scope of protection afforded by § 215(a)(3).67  
 
58 626 F. Supp. 2d 994 (E.D. Mo. 2009). 
59 See id. at 997, 1001. 
60 Id. at 999.  
61 Clevinger v. Motel Sleepers, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 322, 324 (W.D. Va. 1999).   
62 See Redmond, supra note 6, at 334 (citing HERMAN A. WECHT, WAGE-HOUR 
LAW: COVERAGE 29 (1951)).  
63 10 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1993). 
64 See id. at 50–52, 56. 
65 See id. at 55 (citing EEOC v. Romeo Cmty. Schs., 976 F.2d 985, 990 (6th Cir. 
1992) (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Not only does 
this interpretation not protect informal oral complaints, it does not protect a written 
memorandum given to a supervisor. See Kelly v. City of Mount Vernon, 344 F. Supp. 
2d 395, 405–06 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
66 See Lambert, 10 F.3d at 55. The Lambert Court concluded that there was no 
need to defer to the opinion stated in the EEOC Compliance Manual, which states 
that FLSA retaliation protection should “encompass informal workplace complaints” 
since the “intent of Congress [was] clear, that [was] the end of the matter.” Id. 
(quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 
(1984)). 
67 See Kelly, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 405–06 (holding that a written complaint to a 
supervisor was not protected from employer retaliation since it was not formally 
made to the DOL). 
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The courts that argue for a broad interpretation of 
§ 215(a)(3) generally find that its language is somewhat vague, 
leaving open the possibility that certain types of oral complaints 
may trigger FLSA protection.  For example, after using a 
dictionary to interpret the phrase “filed any complaint,” the First 
Circuit concluded that an employee who sent a letter to her 
supervisor stating that she was entitled to overtime pay was 
protected from retaliation by § 215(a)(3).68  The court concluded 
that its language was sufficiently ambiguous to protect most 
informally made complaints.69  However, the court stated that 
“not all abstract grumblings will suffice to constitute the filing of 
a complaint with one’s employer”70 and advised all courts within 
the circuit to determine an employee’s protection under 
§ 215(a)(3) on a case-by-case basis.71  Courts in the Ninth Circuit 
apply a similar rule, in that “not all amorphous expressions of 
discontent related to wages and hours constitute complaints filed 
within the meaning of § 215(a)(3).”72  It just needs to be clear that 
the “employee communicates [orally or written] the substance of 
his allegations to the employer.”73  Some courts apply an even 
broader standard and read § 215(a)(3) to protect any claim under 
the Act.  For example, the Sixth Circuit held that a school 
custodian who verbally told her supervisor that the school was 
“breaking some sort of law” by not paying male and female 
employees equally was a sufficient assertion of her statutory 
rights.74  The court came to this conclusion without imposing any 
of the qualifications discussed in Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc.  
 
 
68 Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 45 (1st Cir. 1999). 
69 See id. at 41–42. The court determined that by using the word “any” in the 
phrase “filed any complaint,” Congress left open the possibility that it could relate to 
less formal expressions. Id. at 42. Similarly, the court found that if the phrase “filed 
any complaint” was limited to formally filed complaints, the additional language, “or 
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding,” becomes superfluous. Id.  
70 Id. at 44. Requiring more than “abstract grumblings” is important because 
“[w]ork places are rarely idyllic retreats, and the mere fact that an employee is 
displeased by an employer’s act or omission does not elevate that act or omission to 
the level of a materially adverse employment action.” Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 
725 (1st Cir. 1996). 
71 See Valerio, 173 F.3d at 45. 
72 Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1007 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 
73 Id. at 1008.  
74 EEOC v. Romeo Cmty. Schs., 976 F.2d 985, 989–90 (6th Cir. 1992) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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B. Analyzing the Purpose of the FLSA To Clarify any 
Remaining Ambiguity  
After reading the language of § 215(a)(3), courts look to the 
purpose of the Act to determine whether to protect informal 
complaints.  The courts that broadly interpret § 215(a)(3) harp on 
the Supreme Court’s view that the FLSA has “remedial and 
humanitarian”75 purposes to ensure that “all employees may 
obtain a decent standard of living.”76  Congress chose to rely on 
employees to secure their rights under the statute by voicing 
their grievances without the fear of retaliation that may, without 
federal oversight, induce aggrieved employees to quietly accept 
substandard conditions.77  These courts argue that a broad 
interpretation of § 215(a)(3) will promote this “animating spirit” 
by prohibiting employer intimidation.78  Therefore, the broad 
view suggests that a construction of § 215(a)(3) that protects only 
formally made complaints “would do violence to the statute’s 
goals.”79   
In contrast, some courts of appeals will not even look beyond 
the language of the statute to the policy governing the Act.80  
These courts find that the plain language of § 215(a)(3) is 
“paramount to any purpose, remedial or otherwise.”81  That said, 
other courts applying a strict interpretation of § 215(a)(3) 
consider the purpose of the Act as a factor in their 
 
75 Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 
(1944) (stating that the “remedial and humanitarian” provisions of the Act are, in 
general, not to be applied in a “narrow, grudging manner”). 
76 Daniel v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 57, 59 (N.D. Ga. 1985). 
77 See Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960); Brock 
v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 124 (3d Cir. 1987). “For weighty practical and other 
reasons, Congress did not seek to secure compliance with prescribed standards 
through continuing detailed federal supervision or inspection of payrolls. Rather 
[Congress relies] on information and complaints received from employees seeking to 
vindicate rights claimed to have been denied. . . . [E]ffective enforcement could thus 
only be expected if employees [feel] free to approach officials with their 
grievances. . . . Congress sought to foster a climate in which compliance with the 
substantive provisions of the Act would be enhanced.” Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292. 
78 Brock, 812 F.2d at 124. 
79 Daniel, 611 F. Supp. at 59.  
80 “[W]here Congress has made the public policy decision and expressed it 
clearly, as in § 215(a)(3)’s plain and unambiguous language, it is not open to courts 
to trump or change this decision in the name of statutory interpretation” to reach, 
what the court deems, a more sensible result. O’Neill v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 956 
F. Supp. 661, 664 n.6 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
81 Jennifer Clemons, FLSA Retaliation: A Continuum of Employee Protection, 53 
BAYLOR L. REV. 535, 553 (2001). 
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determination.82  For example, the Seventh Circuit recognizes 
that the remedial nature of § 215(a)(3) warrants an expansive 
interpretation but not a reading so expansive as to protect oral 
complaints.83   
C. Comparisons Between § 215(a)(3) and Other Anti-Retaliation 
Provisions 
Many courts find helpful analogies from similar anti-
retaliatory provisions to either support or reject an argument 
that the anti-retaliatory provision of the FLSA protects 
informally made oral complaints.84  In general, courts look at the 
anti-retaliation provisions of the Age Discrimination and 
Employment Act (“ADEA”),85 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (“Title VII”),86 and the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”).87 
Courts that strictly interpret § 215(a)(3) distinguish the Act 
with the anti-retaliation language of the ADEA, which was 
originally enacted by Congress as part of the FLSA.88  The ADEA 
“forbid[s] employers from retaliating against any employee who 
‘has opposed any practice’ that is unlawful under the statutes.”89  
The Seventh Circuit found it “significant” that Congress chose 
the narrower phrase “filed any complaint” when enacting 
§ 215(a)(3) of the FLSA.90  By finding that the “cause of action for 
 
82 See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text. 
83 See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 840 
(7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (No. 09-834). 
84 Compare Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993) (contrasting 
the broadly construed Title VII retaliation provision with § 215(a)(3)), with Lambert 
v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1006–07 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (relying on courts that 
compared nonretaliatory policies of other statutes to establish that a broad 
interpretation of § 215(a)(3) was proper). 
85 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621–34 (West 2011).  
86 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
87 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006). 
88 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 
602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621–34). Therefore, “much of the 
extensive ADEA jurisprudence is directly relevant to FLSA questions.” THE FAIR 
LABOR STANDARDS ACT, supra note 13, at 27. In 1979, all aspects of the 
administration of the ADEA were transferred over to the EEOC. See 29 U.S.C. § 625; 
29 U.S.C.A. § 626(a)–(b); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 209, 211. 
89 Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 840 (7th 
Cir. 2009) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(d)), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (No. 09-
834). This prohibition has been interpreted to protect verbal complaints. See Kotcher 
v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 1992). 
90 Kasten, 570 F.3d at 840. 
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retaliation under the FLSA is much more circumscribed”91 than 
under the ADEA, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a strict 
interpretation of the phrase “filed any complaint” is proper 
because “Congress could have, but did not, use broader language 
in the FLSA’s retaliation provision.”92 
Both the strict and the broad groups compare and contrast 
the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII to § 215(a)(3).  Title VII 
protects employees who “oppose[ ] any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice.”93  This retaliation provision encompasses 
any method of complaint, formal or informal, that could 
reasonably be interpreted by the employer as opposition to 
discrimination.94   
The strict camp distinguishes the language of § 215(a)(3) 
from the language of the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII.  
For example, a district court decided that “oppose any practice” is 
far broader than the protection found in the narrow limitations of 
the FLSA.95  This broad “opposition clause” brings informal 
protests and oral complaints within the ambit of protected 
activity.96  Therefore, the court concluded that the scope of the 
FLSA anti-retaliation provision is much more limited and “does 
not extend to activities that fall outside its clear text.”97  In 
addition, the Fourth Circuit found that the anti-retaliation 
language of the FLSA is “much more circumscribed” than the 
 
91 Id. (quoting Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000)).  
92 Id. 
93 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). Title VII prohibits 
discrimination of an employee because of an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin. Id. § 2000e-2.  
94 See EEOC Compl. Man., supra note 40, § 8-II(B)(2), (3)(b); see also Redmond, 
supra note 6, at 343. The EEOC maintains that the theory behind the Title VII 
retaliation scheme is that “Title VII’s protections against workplace discrimination 
mean little if retaliation discourages people from filing charges in the first place.” 
Marilee L. Miller, The Employer Strikes Back: The Case for a Broad Reading of Title 
VII’s Bar on Retaliation, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 505, 520.   
95 See Bartis v. John Bommarito Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 2d 994, 
999 (E.D. Mo. 2009). 
96 See Jackson v. Advantage Commc’ns, Inc., No. 4:08CV00353 SWW, 2009 WL 
2508210, at *6 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 14, 2009). Given the similarities between the 
proposed amendment of § 215(a)(3) pending before the Senate and the ADEA and 
Title VII anti-retaliation provisions, oral complaints related to wage discrimination 
would be protected activity under the new FLSA provision, if enacted. See supra 
notes 42–48 and accompanying text. 
97 Bartis, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 1000. 
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anti-retaliation language of Title VII.98  While the court did not 
condone retaliatory conduct, all it could feasibly do was invite 
Congress to change the language of § 215(a)(3) to be more like 
the nonretaliatory language of Title VII.99  
On the other hand, the broad camp gives no credence to the 
comparison between the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII 
and that of the FLSA.  This group argues that the FLSA was 
written seventy-two years ago, when statutes were far less 
detailed and written simpler.100  It goes on to conclude, “[t]he fact 
that Congress decided to include a more detailed anti-retaliation 
provision more than a generation later, when it drafted Title VII, 
tells us little about what Congress meant at the time it drafted 
the comparable provision of the FLSA.”101   
Some courts also compare the anti-retaliation provision of 
the NLRA to § 215(a)(3).  The NLRA makes it unlawful to 
“discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee 
because he has filed charges or given testimony under this 
subchapter.”102  The Supreme Court has found that given the 
policy and objective of the NLRA to protect employees from 
employer intimidation, there is enough ambiguity in the 
language of the provision to afford broader protection to the 
employee.103  Proponents of the broad interpretation generally 
 
98 Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000); see also 
Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing EEOC v. Romeo 
Cmty. Schs., 976 F.2d 985, 990 (6th Cir. 1992) (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part)) (noting that § 215(a)(3) on its face prohibits retaliation 
based on “three expressly enumerated types of conduct,” in contrast to the much 
broader retaliation wording in Title VII). 
99 See Ball, 228 F.3d at 364–65. The court stated that if the employer did 
retaliate against the employee, it “would provide an example of why Congress found 
it necessary in other contexts to enact broader anti-retaliation provisions. . . . But 
this moral judgment does not justify a conclusion—contrary to the plain language of 
the FLSA . . . .” Id. at 365. Congress is currently considering whether to accept that 
invitation to amend § 215(a)(3) to be more like Title VII or the ADEA. See supra 
notes 42–48 and accompanying text. 
100 See Lambert v. Ackerly, 180 F.3d 997, 1005 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).  
101 Id. 
102 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2006). The NLRA 
protects employees’ right to form, join, or assist labor unions; to bargain collectively 
with their employers; and to engage in other forms of concerted activity. See id. 
§ 157. 
103 NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972) (noting that “the presence of the 
preceding words ‘to discharge or otherwise discriminate’ reveals . . . particularly by 
the word ‘otherwise,’ an intent on the part of Congress to afford broad rather than 
narrow protection”). However, this case only answered the question of whether a 
sworn written statement to a field examiner constituted a protected activity and did 
CP_Ross (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011  2:12 PM 
1558 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1543   
conclude that the language of the anti-retaliation provision of the 
NLRA is just as inclusive.104  Therefore, when applying the broad 
construction of the anti-retaliation provision of the NLRA to 
§ 215(a)(3), one court found that an employee’s oral and written 
complaints to her supervisor entitled her to protection under the 
Act.105   
III. ANALYZING THE LANGUAGE, PURPOSE, AND POLICY OF 
§ 215(A)(3) 
Although the similar retaliation provisions do not provide 
significant guidance on how to interpret § 215(a)(3), the balance 
between the plain language of § 215(a)(3), its purpose, and the 
potential costs if informal oral complaints were to be protected 
weighs in favor of a construction of § 215(a)(3) that does not 
protect verbal complaints.  Requiring an employee to put his 
complaint in writing, whether formally made to a government 
agency or informally made to an employer, furthers the purposes 
of § 215(a)(3).  
A. There Is Limited Guidance Provided by the Similar Anti-
Retaliation Provisions 
Of the three retaliation provisions discussed, only the ADEA 
should guide the courts on how to interpret § 215(a)(3).  Although 
the ADEA was originally enacted as part of the FLSA, Congress 
chose to write its anti-retaliation provision in a much less 
“circumscribed” fashion.106  Because “a judge must presume that 
Congress chose its words with as much care as the judge himself 
brings to bear on the task of statutory interpretation,”107 it 
cannot be presumed that Congress intended “filed any complaint” 
and “opposed any practice” to be interpreted the same way.  This 
suggests that § 215(a)(3), unlike the ADEA, does not protect oral 
complaints.  
 
not address the question of whether informal verbal complaints were covered within 
the scope of the NLRA. Id. at 121.  
104 See Daniel v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 57, 60 (N.D. Ga. 1986).  
105 See id. at 63. 
106 See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 840 
(7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 
2009)), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (No. 09-834). 
107 See FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 635 (1982) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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Scholars have argued that the policies shaping the EEOC 
Compliance Manual’s broad interpretation of the anti-retaliation 
provision of Title VII should apply equally to § 215(a)(3).108  
However, there is no need for the FLSA to defer to EEOC 
interpretations.  The reasons that the EEOC policies are not 
compelling are numerous.  First, courts generally do not defer to 
the EEOC view of what constitutes an adverse employment 
action because many believe that the EEOC lacks substantive 
rulemaking authority under Title VII.109  Second, the Department 
of Labor has sole administrative control over the FLSA, not the 
EEOC.110  Third, the EEOC, in its Compliance Manual, bases its 
broad interpretation merely on its reading of judicial precedent, 
as opposed to the agency’s own interpretation; therefore, its 
statements are not binding on courts.111  Thus, Title VII provides 
no guidance on how to interpret § 215(a)(3) of the FLSA. 
Similarly, although the Supreme Court adopted a liberal 
construction of the NLRA anti-retaliation provision, the Court 
did so only with regard to the question of whether sworn written 
statements were within the scope of protected activity.112  The 
Court never suggested that oral complaints made to the employer  
 
 
 
108 See, e.g., Redmond, supra note 6, at 339–40. 
109 Miller, supra note 94, at 523. Courts must afford high levels of deference to 
agencies’ interpretations “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the 
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency 
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that 
authority.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
865 (1984). However, as the Court emphasized in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., “a high 
degree of deference is simply not appropriate in all cases.” Miller, supra note 94, at 
524 (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). “[A]n agency’s opinion is rewarded with high 
deference only when the agency provided for formal procedures⎯including notice 
and comment or formal adjudication⎯in forming those opinions.” Id. (citing United 
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001)). Therefore the EEOC’s authority in 
regard to interpretations of substantive issues is not very clear. See id. at 525; see 
also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 111 n.6 (2002) (“The 
EEOC’s interpretive guidelines do not receive Chevron deference. . . . Such 
interpretations are ‘entitled to respect’ . . . but only to the extent that those 
interpretations have the ‘power to persuade.’ ” (internal citations omitted)). 
110 See THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, supra note 13, at 40. The Department 
of Labor has not issued its opinion on the meaning of “filed any complaint” within 
§ 215(a)(3) of the FLSA. 
111 See Hodgson & Sons, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 49 F.3d 822, 
826 (1st Cir. 1995). 
112 See NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 125 (1972). 
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were protected activity.113  Therefore, the anti-retaliation 
provision of the NLRA should not provide guidance to courts in 
their analysis of § 215(a)(3).   
B. A Plain Reading of § 215(a)(3)  
Courts, in construing the language of a statute, are 
instructed to begin with “the language of the statute itself.”114  
“Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, 
that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.”115  
Because there is no legislative history on point, the language of 
§ 215(a)(3) is where to begin the analysis.116   
By “giving effect to the normal, everyday usage of the 
words”of the statute, § 215(a)(3) excludes oral complaints from 
protection.117  Combining “filed” with “any complaint” does not 
create a phrase that is “susceptible to many different 
interpretations” when it comes to protecting oral complaints.118  
For example, the First Circuit used a dictionary to define 
“complaint” but concluded that the definition was ambiguous.119  
However, while the definition of complaint includes “the act or 
action of expressing protest, censure, or resentment: expression 
of injustice,”120 all of which may be done informally, Congress put 
the word “filed,” a verb, before “any complaint” for a reason.  
“Filed,” when used as a verb, means “[t]o deliver (a paper or 
instrument) to the proper officer so that it is received by him to 
 
113 See id.  
114 Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 
(1980). 
115 Id. 
116 Cf. Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 45 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting 
that the legislative history of the FLSA provides no guidance as to the intended 
scope of § 215(a)(3)). 
117 See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 482 (1990) (“If the statute is clear and 
unambiguous that is the end of the matter, for the court . . .  must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress[,] . . .  [that is,] the plain meaning of 
the statute . . . .” (quoting K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291–92 (1988)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
118 Redmond, supra note 6, at 332.   
119 See Valerio, 173 F.3d at 41. The court found that “[b]y failing to specify that 
the filing of any complaint need to be with a court or an agency, and by using the 
word ‘any,’ Congress left open the possibility that it intended ‘complaint’ to relate to 
less formal expressions of protest, censure, resentment, or injustice conveyed to an 
employer.” Id. 
120 Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 464 (1971)). 
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[be] kept on file, or among the records of his office.”121  Thus, 
“filed” formalizes the procedure of making a complaint.  One 
court asserts that congressional intent is unclear because the use 
of the word “any” creates the possibility that Congress intended 
the provision to apply to any type of complaint, including 
informal complaints.122  However, “any complaint” is modified by 
“filed.”  Therefore, while one may file an expression of protest, 
censure, resentment, or injustice in writing, one cannot file said 
expression orally.123 
Furthermore, if Congress enacts the proposed amendments 
to the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, it will demonstrate 
its belief that “filed any complaint” should be strictly construed.  
By broadening the language of § 215(a)(3) with respect to wage-
based complaints,124 but not for other types of FLSA-related 
complaints, Congress would be implying that “filed any 
complaint” means something different than what is being 
proposed.  Because opposing or inquiring about wage-related 
issues125 would undoubtedly protect informally made oral 
complaints, it would render the amendments superfluous if “filed 
any complaint” were to be construed in the same way with regard 
to non-wage-based issues.126 
Moreover, the plain meaning approach to interpreting 
§ 215(a)(3) is justified by democratic considerations.  Adhering to 
the plain meaning of a statute, in general, promotes democratic 
values in lawmaking and deference to our representatives since 
Congress votes on the language of a bill.127  As one commentator 
 
121 See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 838 
(7th Cir. 2009) (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 945 (2d ed. 1958)) (emphasis added), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 
1890 (2010) (No. 09-834).  
122 See id. (citing Valerio, 173 F.3d at 42); Redmond, supra note 6, at 333. 
123 Kasten, 570 F.3d at 839. 
124 The proposed amendment would generally protect an employee who opposed 
or inquired about wage-related issues. See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying 
text. 
125 See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text (discussing the new possible 
language of the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA). 
126 When construing a statute, courts should avoid rendering parts of it 
superfluous. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 
(1991).  
127 See Katherine A. Rocco, Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure: In the Interest of Full Disclosure?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2227, 2243 (2008) 
(citing Robert S. Summers, Judge Richard Posner’s Jurisprudence, 89 MICH. L. REV. 
1302, 1320 (1991) (book review)). 
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argues, the plain meaning of language allows citizens to rely on 
published law.128  This creates a “zone of certainty” because the 
language of the statute means what it says and is thus safe to 
rely on.129  Subjecting citizens to a special meaning contrary to 
the clear statutory language operates to “jerk the rug from 
beneath them.”130  Furthermore, adhering to the clear language 
of a statute supports formal equality since the law will be the 
same for everyone and applied in the same way.131  Therefore, by 
following a plain meaning approach to interpreting § 215(a)(3), 
all employees will be treated equally and all employers can rely 
on established law in making the business decision to no longer 
retain an employee. 
C. The Purpose of the FLSA  
Even if the court looks behind the clear and unambiguous 
language of § 215(a)(3), the history and purpose of the Act do not 
mandate protection for informal verbal complaints.  The FLSA is 
a remedial statute that was enacted to address long-festering 
labor issues culminating in the Great Depression.132  The broad 
camp argues that the provision was designed to encourage 
employees to report substantive violations without fear of 
retalitaion.133  Thus, this group argues that a narrow 
construction of the anti-retaliation provision creates an 
atmosphere of intimidation and defeats the Act’s goal of 
preventing employees’ attempts to secure their rights from being 
a “calculated risk.”134   
 
128 See id. (citing Summers, supra note 127, at 1321). 
129 See Ruth Sullivan, Legal Drafting: The Plain Meaning Rule and Other Ways 
to Cheat at Statutory Interpretation, http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~resulliv/legdr/pmr 
.html#N_1 (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). This emphasis on the text ensures that the law 
is certain and that the public has fair notice, both of which are prerequisites for 
effective law. See id.  
130 Rocco, supra note 127, at 2243 (quoting Summers, supra note 127, at 1321). 
131 Sullivan, supra note 129. 
132 See Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 
(1944). 
133 See Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960) 
(“[F]ear of economic retaliation might often operate to induce aggrieved employees 
quietly to accept substandard conditions.”). 
134 See, e.g., Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 43 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(quoting Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 293). 
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While allowing employees to pursue informal internal 
remedies benefits both the employee and the employer,135 there 
must be limits, given the language of the statute.  It is true that 
Congress chose, in enacting its remedial statute, to prevent an 
environment in which employees choose silence over 
unemployment.136  However, this does not mean that Congress 
chose to have its carefully designed statute read completely 
outside its wording.137  Given the high burden that must be met 
to justify interpreting a statute beyond its clear and 
unambiguous language, the legislative purpose, while 
compelling, does not validate changing the defined meaning of 
“filed.”138  Congress made its policy decision in its clear word 
choice; therefore, it is not open for courts to trump this 
determination in the name of statutory interpretation or for the 
purpose of reaching a more sensible result.139   
D. Effect on an Employer’s Business 
A consideration of the costs imposed on employers if informal 
oral complaints are protected shows why they should not come 
within the ambit of § 215(a)(3) protection.  First, as a result of 
universally broad protection, there would be an “increase [in] the 
number of retaliation lawsuits filed, thus increasing the amount 
of money employers need to devote to defending the claims.”140  
This would inevitably lead to a reduction in salaries and 
shareholder dividends as litigation expenses would rise.  
Alternatively, this increase in expenses could be passed on to 
consumers in the form of increased costs.   
 
135 Redmond, supra note 6, at 335 (citing Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 478–79 (3d Cir. 1993)). “A construction of the 
statute requiring an employee to file a formal external complaint denies the 
employer an opportunity to resolve the situation quietly and promptly.” Id. at 335–
36 (citing Clean Harbors Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Herman, 146 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 
1998)).  
136 See Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292. 
137 It took three congressional hearings and more than a year to get this bill 
passed into law. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, supra note 13, at 14–15.  
138 See United States v. Sabri, 326 F.3d 937, 943 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting United 
States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985)). 
139 See O’Neill v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 956 F. Supp. 661, 664 n.6 (E.D. Va. 
1997). 
140 Redmond, supra note 6, at 338–39 (citing David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of 
Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing out the 
Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
73, 76–78 (1999)).  
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Second, an increase in the number of lawsuits would force 
employers to settle claims without regard to the merits of each 
case.141  It is easy to imagine a situation in which an employee 
who was fired for poor workmanship manufactures a retaliation 
claim after the fact by asserting that he was fired for verbally 
complaining to his boss.142  Given the deference to the employee 
under the remedial provisions of the FLSA, the employer would 
have difficulty defending itself because of a lack of compelling 
evidence in its favor.143  This unnecessarily puts the burden on 
the employer to decide whether it is worthwhile to try to defend 
itself in court.144  Requiring an employee to put his complaint in 
writing establishes a record that allows the employer to properly 
investigate an employee’s claim to determine whether settlement 
or litigation should be the next step.  Demanding “some sort of a 
writing”145 from the employee increases the authority of proof and 
puts the employer and employee on equal footing in terms of 
discovery and litigation. 
Shifting the burden to the employer to file all orally-made 
complaints does not put the parties on equal ground.  For 
example, the First Circuit expects employers to place employee 
complaints on file among the employer’s official records.146  While 
this would solve the problem of disadvantaging an employer 
during litigation since every complaint would be accounted for, it 
is an unrealistic expectation.  Assuming that all complaints, 
whether or not they are related to statutorily-enumerated 
protected conduct, will be placed on a company’s official records 
puts a substantial burden on supervisors and managers.  This 
would require the company to prepare a formal memorandum 
every time a complaint is raised or would require the company to 
add staff dedicated to this process.  The end result would be 
increased operating costs and either salary cuts or increased 
costs to consumers.  Putting the light burden on an employee to 
 
141 See Sherwyn, supra note 140, at 81.  
142 See generally Kelly v. City of Mount Vernon, 344 F. Supp. 2d 395, 405–06 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
143 See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 31–34 
and accompanying text (discussing the burden-shifting scheme). 
144 Settlements are advantageous to an employer since “they eliminate the 
uncertainty and cost of protracted litigation.” Pierce v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe 
Ry. Co., 110 F.3d 431, 437 (7th Cir. 1997). 
145 See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 840 
(7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (No. 09-834). 
146 See Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 41–42 (1st Cir. 1999). 
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write a letter when he or she has a complaint would not frustrate 
the purpose of the statute since the employee would still be 
protected.147  Further, it encourages the employee to think about 
his complaint and consider its merits before giving the employer 
a record of it. 
E. Awaiting the Supreme Interpretation 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kasten v. Saint-
Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. to determine whether oral 
complaints are protected from retaliation under the FLSA.148  
Although there has been no decision rendered yet, it seems likely 
from the context of the October 2010 oral argument that a win 
for employers is on the horizon.149   
Justice Alito, for example, stated that the word “filing” 
usually indicates that there is a written document and further 
suggested that if an oral complaint is protected from retaliation, 
then anybody could claim he or she was retaliated against and 
have his or her story corroborated by colleagues, whether true or 
not.150  Along the same lines, Justice Sotomayor was concerned 
that if an oral complaint comes within the umbrella of filing a 
complaint, then an employee at a cocktail party who says 
something in passing to his or her boss could make a retaliation 
charge if he or she was later fired.151  Similarly, in response to 
the plaintiff’s counsel’s claim that he was “filing” a complaint 
with the Supreme Court as he was making his oral argument, 
Justice Scalia said that such an assertion was “absurd” and that 
“people don’t talk like that.”152  Justice Kennedy implied which 
way he was leaning when he jokingly stated, “I would like to go 
back to the question Justice Scalia filed just earlier,” which was 
followed by laughter.153  Justice Roberts also seems to fall on the 
side of a strict interpretation, as indicated by his questioning of 
 
147 The proposed amendments to the statute would further reduce the burden on 
the employee, since the only time he would have to produce a written document 
would be with respect to overtime or hours complaints, not wage-based complaints. 
See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text. 
148 Kasten, 130 S. Ct. at 1890. 
149 Justice Kagan recused herself from this decision. 
150 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6–7, Kasten, 570 F.3d 834 (No. 09-834) 
[hereinafter Oral Argument], available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/09-834.pdf. 
151 See id. at 5. 
152 Id. at 13. 
153 Id. 
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how a boss could know whether someone is asserting his or her 
statutory rights when the employee makes a verbal complaint.154  
Although Justice Thomas did not say anything during oral 
argument, he is a noted textualist and will likely fall on the side 
of a strict interpretation.155    
On the other hand, Justice Ginsburg suggested that the law, 
as written, does not mandate that a complaint must be in writing 
and that Congress may have had illiterate people and 
immigrants in mind when it crafted the FLSA in the 1930s.156  
Similarly, Justice Breyer indicated that an oral complaint should 
be protected if it were formally made, thus eliminating the 
potential for someone filing an oral complaint if made in an 
informal environment, such as at a cocktail party or on the 
cafeteria line.157 
CONCLUSION 
The balance between the costs, policy implications, and 
statutory construction weighs more heavily in favor of a 
interpretation of § 215(a)(3) that does not protect verbal 
complaints made in the workplace.  It would stand in stark 
contrast to the language of § 215(a)(3) to allow oral complaints to 
be protected since it is impossible to “ ‘file’ an oral complaint.”158  
All other informally made complaints in writing, which can be 
“filed” by the employer,159 can be protected without the employee 
feeling as if he or she is taking a “calculated risk” by 
complaining.160  The proposed construction allows for courts to 
interpret the language of § 215(a)(3) through its remedial lens 
without throwing the language of § 215(a)(3) by the wayside and 
 
154 Id. at 24. 
155 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 399, 430 (2010) (noting that Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas are 
the “[Supreme] Court’s textualists”). 
156 Oral Argument, supra note 150, at 31. 
157 See id. at 8. 
158 Kasten, 570 F.3d at 838, cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (No. 09-834). 
159 See generally Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 44–45 (1st Cir. 
1999). Anything written includes, but is not limited to, e-mails, text messages, 
BBMs, and tweets since these are all “verifiable.” See Clevinger v. Motel Sleepers, 
Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 322, 324 (W.D. Va. 1999). Also, under this approach, the 
language “instituted any proceeding” would not be rendered superfluous because 
filing a written complaint with an employer is not the same as instituting a 
proceeding. See Clemons, supra note 81, at 552. 
160 See Valerio, 173 F.3d at 43. 
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without putting the expense and risk completely on the 
employer.  While some may find that this interpretation could 
lead to “morally unacceptable” results, it would be unfaithful to 
the clear language of the statute if it were given a more 
expansive reading.161  “Congress knows how to afford broad 
protection against retaliation when it wants,”162 as evidenced by 
its decision to write broader anti-retaliation language in the 
ADEA.  Should Congress decide to amend § 215(a)(3) with regard 
to wage-related issues but not others, it would further show its 
intent to construe “file any complaint” narrowly. 
A proper construction of § 215(a)(3) takes pieces of the 
various arguments for strict and liberal constructions.  This 
presents an interpretation of § 215(a)(3) that accords with the 
language of the statute, without doing “violence”163 to the purpose 
of the FLSA.  A proper construction of § 215(a)(3) would protect 
employees who, in good faith, produce “some sort of writing”164 
asserting their statutory rights under FLSA with “substance”165 
as long as the assertion is more than an “abstract 
grumbling[ ].”166  These requirements ensure that the employee is 
serious about his complaint and that there is a record of the 
complaint, so as to put the employer and employee on equal 
footing in terms of litigation.  All indications are that the 
Supreme Court is leaning toward a narrow interpretation of 
§ 215(a)(3) that will likely comport with the interpretation laid 
out in this Note.  If Congress wants to afford greater protection to 
employees, it should adopt the proposed amendment to the anti-
retaliation provision of the FLSA.167 
 
 
 
161 See Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000). 
162 Bartis v. John Bommarito Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 2d 994, 
1000 (E.D. Mo. 2009). 
163 See Daniel v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 57, 59 (N.D. Ga. 1985). 
164 Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 840 (7th 
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (No. 09-834). 
165 Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1008 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 
166 Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 44 (1st Cir. 1999).  
167 See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text. 
